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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two months of 2018, Belgian 
politics were dominated by controversy on 
whether the Prime Minister could approve 
the so-called UN Migration Compact. The 
disagreement resulted first in a minority 
government and finally led to the resignation 
of the federal government. These events are 
elaborated below, since they constitute the 
most important constitutional developments 
in Belgium over the course of 2018. Next, 
the article gives an overview of the main 
cases of the Belgian Constitutional Court of 
the past year that may be of interest to an 
international audience. Finally, the overview 
looks ahead to the upcoming vacancy in the 
Constitutional Court, a number of interesting 
pending cases and the upcoming electoral 
period.
II. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS
During the last two months of 2018, Belgian 
politics were dominated by controversy. The 
main question at issue was whether Prime 
Minister Charles Michel could approve the 
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Reg-
ular Migration (hereafter: UN Migration 
Compact),1 an intergovernmental agreement 
promoting a common global approach to 
migrant flows, at the UN intergovernmen-
tal conference in Marrakesh on 10 Decem-
ber 2018, and formally endorse it at the UN 
General Assembly on 19 December 2018. 
In spite of it being non-binding, it is gener-
ally accepted that the Compact can be used 
as guidelines for legal developments. In the 
end, the Prime Minister both approved and 
endorsed it, which first resulted in a minority 
government and finally led to the resignation 
of the government. 
After the federal elections of 25 May 2014, 
Flemish parties N-VA, Open VLD and 
established government Michel I. All four 
government parties initially agreed on the 
Compact and PM Michel pledged Belgium’s 
support at the UN General Assembly. Fol-
lowing Austria’s opposition to the Compact 
and the local elections of 14 October 2018, 
which led to an increase of votes for the ex-
treme right party Vlaams Belang, N-VA (i.e., 
New Flemish Alliance, a Flemish nationalist, 
right-wing political party), and more impor-
tantly its Secretary of State for Migration 
Theo Francken, suddenly started to oppose 
the Compact, while the three other govern-
ment parties continued to defend it. This 
created a situation of deadlock. N-VA also 
refused the proposal to write a supplementa-
ry declaration on how the text is interpreted 
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ernment are made on the basis of consensus, 
N-VA could no longer be part of a govern-
ment that would endorse the Compact.
Consequently, as of 9 December, the other 
three parties continued as a minority govern-
ment— which is quite exceptional in Bel-
gian politics—without N-VA and with the 
support of only 52 of 150 seats in the House 
of Representatives. It is controversial wheth-
er this rearrangement established a new gov-
ernment, as the Prime Minister did not of-
fer the resignation of his government to the 
King, but only entailed the dismissal of three 
ministers and two Secretaries of State and a 
redistribution of the powers among the re-
maining members of the government. How-
ever, it became common to refer to (the new) 
“Government Michel II” in the press. The 
opposition claimed that the government re-
quired a vote of confidence, a position which 
was supported by a considerable number of 
scholars, but not by all.
Nonetheless, after ten days, on 18 December, 
the Belgian government eventually fell. PM 
Michel tried to find support from left-wing 
opposition parties in order to stay in pow-
er until the parliamentary elections in May 
2019. However, the socialists and greens an-
nounced that they would table a motion of no 
confidence in Parliament,2 which triggered 
the Prime Minister to offer his resignation 
to the King. The day after, on 19 December, 
PM Michel endorsed the Migration Com-
pact. After consultations with the presidents 
of the political parties, King Filip accepted 
the resignation of the government on 21 De-
cember, which turned it into a caretaker gov-
ernment with limited powers. 
N-VA has proposed a turn to confederalism 
after the federal, state and European elections 
in May 2019. However, it is now uncertain 
whether a list with constitutional provisions 
susceptible to amendment will be approved 
before the elections. According to the consti-
tutional amendment procedure of Article 195 
of the Constitution, that is necessary in order 
to be able to amend the Constitution (with a 
two-thirds majority) after the election. Unde-
niably, 2019 will again be an interesting time 
for consociational democracy in Belgium.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CASES
In 2018, the Belgian Constitutional Court 
delivered 183 judgments and handled 226 
cases in total. Regarding the nature of the 
complaints, conflicts of competencies be-
tween the federated entities and the federal 
state only represent 4% of the judgments 
in 2018. The majority of cases concern in-
fringements of fundamental rights. In 2018, 
the principle of equality and non-discrimi-
nation is still the most invoked principle be-
fore the Court (51%), followed by review of 
compliance with the jurisdictional warran-
ties of Article 13 (6%), the property rights 
of Article 16 (6%), the right to private and 
family life of Article 22 (6%), the socioeco-
nomic rights of Article 23 of the Constitu-
tion (6%), the guarantees in taxation matters 
of Articles 170 and 172 (4%), the personal 
freedom and legality of criminal charges of 
Article 12 of the Constitution (4%) and the 
freedom and equality in education of Article 
24 (3%). References were made to the juris-
prudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in 49 cases. Moreover, the 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) is also regularly 
reflected in the judgments of the Constitu-
tional Court, with references to this case law 
in 17 cases. References to other sources of 
international law can be found in 29 cases.
1. Measures of Integration and Exclusion
At the end of 2016, the Belgian legislator 
inserted two new conditions in the Immigra-
tion Act of 15 December 1980: the so-called 
“integration efforts” and “newcomers decla-
ration.” As to the first condition, a person has 
to provide evidence, in the first term of his 
temporary residence permit, of his willing-
ness to integrate into society. If he is unable 
to prove his “reasonable effort” to integrate, 
the Immigration Office can put an end to its 
permit. The second condition implies that a 
person applying for a residence permit needs 
to sign a declaration indicating that he or she 
“understands the fundamental values and 
norms of society and will act accordingly.” 
Signing this “newcomers declaration” will be 
a condition of admissibility for the residence 
permit. In case no. 126/2018, the Constitu-
tional Court rejected almost all arguments 
invoked against both conditions. However, it 
ruled out that the criminal past of a person 
can be taken into account when measuring 
his integration efforts because of the dispro-
portionately wide scope of that criterion. It 
is also interesting to note that the freedom 
of expression and religion, according to the 
Court, includes the right of a person not to 
reveal his convictions. It observes, howev-
er, that the newcomers declaration does not 
compel a person to accept the fundamental 
values and norms of society, but only to un-
derstand them and act accordingly.
Under Article 23 of the Citizenship Code, 
citizens may have their citizenship with-
drawn if they seriously breach their duties 
as Belgian citizens, provided that the with-
drawal does not result in the person con-
cerned being made stateless. This provision 
makes it possible to exclude certain citizens 
from the national community when their 
conduct demonstrates that they do not accept 
the basic rules of community life and seri-
ously infringe on the rights and freedom of 
their fellow citizens. The Antwerp Court of 
Appeal submitted preliminary questions to 
the Constitutional Court concerning the ap-
plication by the state prosecutor to have FB’s 
Belgian citizenship withdrawn. FB had been 
convicted of criminal offences of acts of vi-
olence and leadership of a terrorist group. In 
case no. 16/2018, the Constitutional Court 
considered the provision not discriminato-
ry. As a matter of fact, citizenship can only 
be withdrawn in cases where citizenship is 
not obtained as a result of birth but on the 
ground of a declaration, before the age of 
18 years. According to the Court, this dif-
ference of treatment is based on an objective 
and relevant distinguishing criterion, which 
2 
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is linked to the way Belgian citizenship was 
acquired and the ties maintained with the 
national community. Further, the Court held 
that the impugned provision did not infringe 
on the general legal principle of non bis in 
idem enshrined in Article 14.7 ICCPR and 
Article 4 Protocol 7 ECHR. The withdrawal 
of citizenship at issue is not a penalty but a 
civil measure. Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the Court, for the first time in its history, 
ruled that the hearing, for security reasons, 
would be televised (interlocutory Judgment 
no. 1/2018). 
2. Fight against Terrorism
In 2018, the Court addressed two cases that 
dealt with regulations regarding counter-ter-
rorism. In case no. 8/2018, the Court rejected 
an appeal for annulment of Article 140sexies 
of the Criminal Code that penalized those 
who leave or enter the national territory with 
the intent to commit terrorist acts or crim-
inal offences of incitement to commit ter-
rorist acts. According to the Court, the fact 
that it can be difficult for the prosecuting 
authorities to prove double “intention” (the 
intention to adopt a specific behavior which 
itself is motivated by a more precise inten-
tion) was insufficient to conclude that this 
provision is inconceivable with the principle 
of legality in criminal matters. Moreover, it 
did not affect the free movement of persons. 
The Court concluded that the text of this 
Article, despite its general scope containing 
cross-references, is sufficiently foreseeable 
and a more precise definition of the term “in-
tention” is not necessary. It is for the judge 
to assess this intention objectively on a case-
by-case basis.
Case no. 31/2018 concerned an action for an-
nulment of two Articles of the act containing 
a number of provisions to combat terrorism 
(here: Terro III). The first item was Article 2 
Terro III, which amended Article 140bis of 
the Criminal Code in three different ways, 
of which two were challenged before the 
Constitutional Court. Article 140bis, final 
sentence, of the Criminal Code contained a 
so-called “risk requirement,” which means 
that only serious indications of a possible 
terrorist crime may be punished. Article 2, 3° 
Terro III deleted that risk requirement aimed 
at simplifying the assessment of evidence. 
However, this deletion was annulled by the 
Constitutional Court because it violated the 
freedom of expression. The Court considered 
that the intended aim does not justify that a 
person is likely to be sentenced to five to ten 
years’ imprisonment and be fined, even if the 
risk requirement would not be fulfilled. The 
Court stipulated that the effects of this pro-
vision remained in force until 1 September 
2018. The second item was Article 6 Terro 
III, which facilitates the conditions for is-
suing an arrest warrant in cases of terrorist 
crimes that exceed the maximum penalty of 
five years. The Court rejected this action as 
unfounded because the rights of the accused 
are not disproportionately affected. The pro-
cedural safeguards were still guaranteed, in-
cluding the fact that the investigating judge 
remains competent.
3. Access to Justice (pro bono legal advice)
In 2018, the Constitutional Court ruled in 
two remarkable cases relating to access to 
justice, specifically with regard to pro bono
legal advice. In one of them, a rare argu-
ment concerning forced labor was raised. 
Pro bono legal advice is a service to which 
citizens are entitled if certain conditions are 
met. This advice is offered by attorneys who 
are later paid by the government on the ba-
sis of a performance-related code. Attorneys 
usually offer their services voluntarily. In an 
act in 2016 however, the legislator decided 
that the bar association can force attorneys to 
perform pro bono whenever this is necessary 
for the effectiveness of the service. Qualify-
ing this measure as forced labor, a number 
of attorneys and a bar association applied to 
the Constitutional Court. In its decision no. 
41/2018, the Court disagreed. It observed 
that attorneys have a significant role to play 
in the administration of justice. They also en-
joy certain privileges. Given that, they can 
be expected to contribute to the performance 
of the justice system, which is a pillar of the 
rule of law. Moreover, pro bono services are 
an essential element of the right to legal aid 
as provided in Article 23 of the Constitu-
tion. Qualifying lawyers are free to exercise 
the profession of attorney as they please, so 
whoever chooses this profession accepts the 
burdens that come with it, including provid-
ing pro bono services. As such, the Court 
concluded, the measure does not violate the 
right to free choice of a profession, nor does 
it constitute forced labor.
The Court’s judgment in case no. 77/2018 
potentially has more far-reaching conse-
quences. During the last years, access to jus-
tice has increasingly been analyzed through 
the prism of financial access. Obviously, 
access to pro bono services is an essential 
component of that. Through the act of 2016 
already mentioned above, the legislator had 
restricted the access to those services by im-
posing a broader definition of the means tak-
en into account to determine an individual’s 
need for assistance and by tightening pre-
sumptions of need and control mechanisms. 
In addition, the legislator introduced a limit-
ed, flat rate contribution required from any-
one relying on pro bono services. Although 
the law provided for general and individual 
exceptions, the Constitutional Court struck 
this new financial burden in view of the 
standstill obligation in Article 23 of the Con-
stitution. The Court was puzzled by the idea 
that a contribution was imposed on litigants 
who were, by definition, incapable of paying 
for their legal advice. By lack of numbers 
demonstrating a real problem of overcon-
sumption, the argument that the measure was 
intended to promote a responsible litigation 
attitude was equally rejected. As a result, for 
the first time, the Court found a violation of 
the standstill obligation as it is applicable to 
the right to legal aid.
4. Curtailing the Vulture Funds
The Federal Act of 12 July 2015 curtails the 
activities of so-called “Vulture Funds”; it was 
adopted unanimously by the Belgian Parlia-
ment and found its origin in a bill drafted in 
consultation with the Committee for the Ab-
olition of Illegitimate Debt, an umbrella of a 
bunch of NGOs. The Court rejected an ap-
peal for annulment of that act introduced by 
NML Capital Ltd., a subsidiary of Paul Sing-
er’s hedge fund Elliott Management Corp., 
registered in the Cayman Islands (case no. 
61/2018). The act provides that when cred-
itors pursue an illegitimate advantage by 
the purchase of a State’s loan or debt obli-
gation, their rights towards the debtor State 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471638
26 | I•CONnect-Clough Center 
will be limited to the price they paid for the 
purchase. The challenged act also prohibits 
the issuance of an enforcement order in Bel-
gium, or the adoption of measures aimed at 
ensuring the payment of the debt, where this 
gives the creditor an illegitimate advantage. 
The pursuit of an illegitimate advantage is 
deduced from the existence of a manifest 
disproportion between the purchase value 
of the loan or debt obligation by the creditor 
and the face value of the loan or debt obliga-
tion, or else between the purchase value of 
the loan or debt obligation by the debtor and 
the amount they demand in payment. The 
Court held that this limitation is not infring-
ing property rights, nor primary or secondary 
EU Law, nor the right to a fair trial. The cri-
terion of “manifest disproportion” between 
the said values is deemed to be sufficiently 
precise to be applied by the courts and the 
curtailing to the purchase value is not in-
fringing on the undisturbed enjoyment of the 
property of the creditor.
5. Data Protection
In 2018, the Court addressed four cases that 
dealt with the protection, management and ex-
change of personal data. Case no. 29/2018 con-
cerned an action for annulment of federal legis-
lation that provided for automatic exchange of 
data between utility companies and the provid-
ers of social housing in order to combat domi-
cile fraud. Although the Court acknowledged 
that the measure interfered with the right of 
social tenants to retain respect for their private 
lives ex Article 22 of the Constitution and Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR, it held that it was pertinent and 
proportionate in light of the aim to effectively 
and efficiently combat social fraud. According 
to the Court, the legislator had foreseen suffi-
cient guarantees to contain the pushing, mining 
and storing of data. 
The Flemish Parliament had adopted similar 
legislation in October 2016. Indeed, it had 
also provided for an additional exchange 
of personal data between government de-
partments and agencies in order to combat 
domicile fraud in social housing. The new 
measure essentially required all agencies 
involved in social housing to share informa-
tion with the supervisory authorities if they 
suspected fraud. The Flemish Tenants Asso-
ciation challenged the legislation before the 
Constitutional Court (case no. 104/2018). 
The Court considered the measure to be an 
interference with the right to respect for pri-
vate life ex Article 22 of the Constitution and 
Article 8 ECHR, which was nevertheless jus-
tified in light of the fight against social fraud. 
According to the Court, the legislator imple-
mented strict boundaries for the exchange of 
data. Not only does the information provider 
have to check whether the data are relevant 
and useful for the receiver’s statutory duties 
but the receiver also has to effectively limit 
the use of the information to its statutory du-
ties. Moreover, according to the Court, the 
exchange of data only leads to higher levels 
of government efficiency, since the infor-
mation exchange is limited to relevant data 
that other government agencies involved in 
social housing already obtained. 
In case no. 174/2018, the Constitutional 
Court annulled Articles 39bis, §3 of the Code 
of Criminal Investigation and Article 13 of 
the Act on Special Investigation Methods. 
On the basis of these provisions, the Public 
Prosecutor had become competent to order 
a non-confidential network search, instead 
of the previously competent investigating 
judge. The Court held that an investigation 
method that enables access to all personal 
communication data presents an interfer-
ence with the right to respect for private life 
comparable to a house search or wiretap-
ping. Considering the severity of the inves-
tigation method and the lack of procedural 
safeguards similar to the guarantees comple-
menting a house search, the Court held that 
a network search can only be ordered by an 
investigating judge. 
Last year, the Court referred four cases for 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU. One of these 
cases, concerning the new Belgian Data 
Retention Act, deserves particular attention 
(case no. 96/2018). This act replaced the pre-
vious one annulled by the Court in a judg-
ment (case no. 84/2015)3 narrowly tailored 
to the judgment of the CJEU that declared 
invalid the EU Directive 2006/24/EC on data 
retention.4 The annulled Belgian Act trans-
posed that directive. Meanwhile, the CJEU 
has confirmed and has even strengthened 
its views in a more recent judgment.5 The 
CJEU held indeed that Directive 2002/58/
EC must be interpreted as precluding na-
tional legislation, which, for the purpose 
of fighting crime, provides for general and 
indiscriminate retention of all traffic and lo-
cation data of all subscribers and registered 
users relating to all means of electronic com-
munication. Furthermore, those provisions 
preclude national legislation governing the 
protection and security of traffic and location 
data and, in particular, access of the compe-
tent national authorities to the retained data, 
where the objective pursued by that access 
(in the context of fighting crime) is not re-
stricted solely to fighting serious crime, 
where access is not subject to prior review 
by a court or an independent administrative 
authority, and where there is no requirement 
that the data concerned should be retained 
within the European Union. However, the 
ECtHR adopted a different view on data re-
tention when it found that Swedish legisla-
tion on the subject did not infringe on Article 
8 ECHR.6 Although the new Belgian Act is 
stricter than the previous one, it nevertheless 
still provides for massive data retention, but 
more limited in time and subject to more 
safeguards to avoid misuse of those data. 
The Constitutional Court found it necessary 
to continue its dialogue with the CJEU, of-
fering it the opportunity to nuance, detail 
or alter its jurisprudence7 given the fact 
that the Belgian legislator is of the opinion 
that it is simply impossible to practice more 
3 See Developments in Belgian Constitutional Law: The Year 2015 in Review: <http://www.iconnectblog.com/2016/10/developments-in-belgian-constitution-
4 Cases C -293/12 and C-594/12  [2014] CJEU.
5 Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15  [2016] CJEU.
6 Centrum för Rättvisa v Sweden App no 35252/08 (ECHR, 19 June 2018). In February 2019, the case was referred to the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber.
7
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differentiated data retention as advocated 
by the CJEU (an opinion that is shared by 
other EU Member States).8 Furthermore the 
Court noted that more than one reference for 
a preliminary ruling was pending before the 
CJEU,9 that an advocate general has deliv-
ered opinions which are critical for the case 
law and that data retention is not only prac-
ticed in view of combating serious crime but 
also, e.g., to protect the physical and moral 
integrity of minors in the fight against sexual 
abuse by electronic communication means.10 
The Court therefore submitted several pre-
liminary questions to the CJEU concerning 
the interpretation of Directive 2002/58/EC 
read in conjunction with the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
On January 1, 2019, 337 cases were pend-
ing before the Constitutional Court. Some of 
these cases are of interest to an internation-
al audience. The Court must, for example, 
decide whether the Unstunned Slaughter 
Ban
Region is compatible with the freedom of 
religion, the separation of church and state 
and the freedom of labour and enterprise, 
and whether the Federal Transgender Act 
respects the non-discrimination principle. 
Various cases concern the right to privacy, 
in particular with regard to the obligation 
to communicate personal data (e.g., client 
data by Airbnb hosts and Air companies) to 
the authorities. Furthermore, we have cas-
es on the Act to Combat Squatting, the act 
providing that there should be a minimum 
service of the railways in case of an indus-
trial action and the act prohibiting some per-
sons to be blood donors. In October 2019, 
a Dutch-speaking11 Justice from the group 
of former MPs,12 Erik Derycke, is retiring, 
which means a new judge from that group 
has to be appointed. Lastly, new elections for 
the European Parliament, the Federal Parlia-
ment and the parliaments of the federated 
entities will be held on 26 May 2019.
8
9 Referrals of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal London, 31 October 2017, Case C 623/17 Privacy International / Secretary of State for Foreign and Com-
and of the Audiencia provincial de Tarragona, Sección cuarta, 14 April 2016, Case C 207/16, Ministerio Fiscal. The Grand Chamber 
has already delivered judgment in the latter case: Case C 307/16 Ministerio Fiscal [2018] CJEU. 
10 See  App no 2872/02 (ECHR, 2 December 2008).
11 The Court is composed of six Dutch-speaking and six French-speaking Justices, each linguistic group electing their own president.
12 The Court is composed of six former Members of Parliament and six Justices with a background in the legal or academic profession.
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